Mark Alfano received a doctorate from the Philosophy Program of the City University of New York Graduate Center (CUNY GC) in 2011. He has been a postdoctoral fellow at the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study and the Princeton University Center for Human Values, as well as assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon. Mark works on moral psychology, broadly construed to include ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of psychology. He also maintains an interest in Nietzsche, focusing on Nietzsche’s psychological views. His papers have appeared in numerous journals, including Philosophical Quarterly, The Monist, Erkenntnis, Synthese, and the British Journal for the History of Philosophy. His first book, Character as Moral Fiction, argues that the challenge to virtue ethics spearheaded by John Doris and Gilbert Harman should be co-opted, not resisted. In 2015, he published Current Controversies in Virtue Theory, which contains new work by Ernest Sosa, Robert Roberts, Heather Battaly, and others. His second monograph, Moral Psychology: An Introduction, was published by Polity Press in 2016. He is currently writing a research monograph on Nietzsche and editing two volumes on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. In more recent work, he has developed a multi-modal measure of intellectual humility. He is now exploring generosity and integrity in collaboration with a neuroscientist, data-mining obituaries to extract patterns of value judgments, and directing a series of edited volumes on The Moral Psychology of the Emotions, which will include books on contempt, anger, disgust, pride, compassion, and forgiveness.
- Mark Alfano (2013). Character as Moral Fiction. Cambridge University Press.
- Mark Alfano (2016). Moral Psychology: An Introduction. Polity.
- Mark Alfano (ed.) (2015). Current Controversies in Virtue Theory. Routledge.
- Mark Alfano & Don Loeb (2014). Experimental moral philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Mark Alfano (2015). An enchanting abundance of types: Nietzsche’s modest unity of virtue thesis. Journal of Value Inquiry, 49(3): 417-35.